Stakes are always high in peace operations, so decent training is vital for the various roles of peacekeepers, the implementation of the mission mandate and for ensuring operational unity, coordination and coherence. Set amid a rapidly changing backdrop, our roundtable discussed the many systemic challenges to UN peacekeeping.
Gone are the days of peacekeepers patrolling buffer zones between two conflict parties. Instead, they face ever more complicated large-scale situations, with diverse and fragmented actors, both state and non-state, while at the same time receiving more complex multi-layered mandates Robust Peacekeeping: A Necessary Evil? The use of force in UN peacekeeping has sparked heated debates in academic and policy circles alike. Is Hybrid Peacekeeping a Model of Success? These bodies are playing more assertive roles both politically and militarily, and the most prominent recent example is the United Nations — African Union Mission in Darfur New technology isn't the cause of inequality — it's the solution.
What does the future hold for our universities? Total military and police personnel peaked around , in , up from about 12, in Recently, however, this trend has reversed.
Peacekeeping forces are down to about 92, as of January While certain countries like China have continued to step up the number of peacekeepers and dollars they contribute, the overall trend has been downsizing, which started in and accelerated in and As a result, the international community rarely meddled with the internal machinations of a given country.
Sovereignty was not to be violated and this was a system which benefited both superpowers, their allies, as well as third world governments. Now, however, with legitimacy being extended to non-state actors, as well as the opportunity for a minority to secede from a given state and form a new country there has been a dramatic shift in the international status quo. Moreover, the international community's model for conflict resolution is heavily influenced by academic thought developed in western countries. This model encourages intervening in civil wars in order to stop political violence and come to a negotiated settlement which often involves democratising efforts.
Clapham's argument is principally in relation to the situation in Rwanda leading up to the genocide ,  whereas Shearer focuses on the negative aspects of intervention, primarily regarding Sierra Leone , which prevents total victory by one side and results in the creation of asymmetries between belligerents which opens the door for continued bloodshed. In Rwanda, third-party attempts at a negotiated settlement between the Hutu and Tutsi afforded an opportunity for Hutu extremists to prepare for the killing of Hutu moderates and the genocide of the Tutsi.
The international community, led by regional states from the Organisation of African Unity , sought to negotiate a settlement and find a solution for the ongoing ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi via the Arusha Peace Process. This process lasted just over a year, included substantial international involvement, and incorporated many regional actors such as Tanzania host of the process , Burundi , Uganda and Zaire. While the Rwandan Patriotic Front RPF was a major beneficiary of the Arusha accords and was able to redress many of its grievances, many of the gains that it made could have been achieved through military action.
Arusha, according to Clapham, affected the relative power of the participants in the two following ways: a ceasefire which froze the distribution of territorial control at a particular point and secondly the importance it ascribed to the participants of the negotiations. A faction's importance was weighted not on their relative popularity or military strength, but on artificial weight assigned by the mediators.
Thus, the entire process served to undermine the RPF's position while stalling their hitherto successful military campaign, while allowing Hutu extremists to prepare for a genocide. Shearer argues that modern strategies that rely solely on consent-based negotiations are severely limited and that victory by military means should not be ignored.
He states that a shift in battlefield fortunes can often bring one belligerent to the negotiation table and will likewise moderate their demands. Consent is of great importance when it comes to negotiation and mediation. The current international system and the conflict resolution model which the international community has utilised most since the end of the Cold War puts a premium on consent. But Shearer asks that if a belligerent uses negotiations and cease-fires as a method of delay in order to allow them to reposition military forces and continue fighting, then should consent-based strategies still be pursued, regardless of the potential for lengthening a conflict and the associated human cost?
According to the empirical analysis cited by Shearer, past civil wars with negotiated settlements have had little success. However, only 14 or 24 percent of those settled were solved by negotiation. The others 76 percent ended with military victories. Additionally, fighting resumed in seven of the 14 conflict which were initially ended by negotiation.
The overall success rate of negotiated settlements, therefore, was around 12 percent out of the internal wars that ended.
In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front , led by Foday Sankoh , fought an ongoing and bloody civil war with the government from to The conflict attracted little international attention, but managed to devastate the country and destroy its economy. Neither belligerent was willing to concede or compromise on their demands, despite multiple attempts at a negotiated settlement. Sankoh would come to the table after the intervention of the private military corporation Executive Outcomes and a reversal in the RUF's battlefield fortunes. In the aftermath the RUF was a depleted threat, civilians were able to return from refugee camps and begin rebuilding their lives.
But the peace was fragile and negotiations were ongoing. The RUF was reluctant to put down their arms, concerned over potential retribution at the hands of army units and civilian militias alike. There was a planned deployment of UN peacekeepers meant to ease these concerns and help with the transition to peace, but things began to unravel.
International contributors began to shy away from further peacekeeping initiatives; such as an expensive and open-ended mission in a strategically unimportant country. As a result, the UN's intervention force was slow to come to fruition and then came to a halt completely when Sankoh argued the size of the contingent of UN peacekeepers was too large. The UN refused to engage without total consent from both parties, thus preventing the deployment of a peacekeeping force. This consent-based approach, Shearer argues, illustrates the limits the UN can play in the volatile and fragile state of affairs that exist during and after civil wars.
It also meant that Sankoh was dictating terms.
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the newly elected President of Sierra Leone terminated the Executive Outcomes contract undermining his hard power advantage. Things were further inflamed when disaffected officers of the army overthrew the government in A small UN force of monitors was deployed to observe the security situation. However, violence would continue. Instead, with British support, an aggressive campaign was waged against the RUF.
By late and early the RUF's military strength had been severely depleted. When the British intervened militarily and substantially degraded the RUF's capability to sustain the conflict, as Executive Outcomes had done years prior, the RUF finally come to the negotiating table and allowed for the establishment of peace. Some authors question the idea of international interventions at all. Using case studies of Uganda , Eritrea , and Somalia , Weinstein demonstrates how states can develop effective institutions out of warfare.
This method has cost and benefits that must be weighed against the potential outcome of international intervention. External intervention can stop mass atrocities, but also stop institutional change.
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Autonomous recovery elevates the strongest leader, but also rewards the strongest fighters who may be less inclined to share power. Furthermore, intervention depends on external influence while autonomous recovery is based on internal factors. Weinstein argues the fundamental challenge is how to incentivise good governance and assistance to rebel groups without disrupting the connection of citizens to rulers in terms of revenue collection that enables accountability.
Although acknowledging a number of practical and moral reasons for peacekeeping operations, James Fearon and David Laitin assert that they have a tendency under some circumstances to become tangled with state-building efforts. In weak states facing successful guerrilla campaigns, peacekeepers face pressures to build state institutional and administrative capacity in order to achieve lasting peace. These pressures can lead to mission creep beyond the original purview of the peacekeeping operation; without engaging in state-building, the peacekeepers risk allowing the peacekept country to revert to violence following their exit.
Thus, Fearon and Laitin advocate for the greater integration of state-building in peacekeeping efforts through a new framework of "neotrusteeship," which would see foreign powers exercising a great deal of control over a weak state's domestic affairs in order to ensure the prevention of future violence.
A growing critique of peacekeeping is the lack of engagement between the peacekeeping officials and the local populace. Additionally, it creates a reinforcement mechanism for the peacekeeping officials, because the officials on the ground report that their plan was successfully implemented, but, in reality, it had adverse effects. If the situation on the ground turns into another outbreak of violence, the local populace will be blamed. This criticism is similar to the critic levelled at development in developing countries by authors such as James C. Scott,  James Ferguson, and L.
The third-party officials-whether they are peacekeepers or agents of development-are isolated from the general populace, believing they know what is best, and refusing to gather information from a ground level. This is not out of maliciousness or imperialism, but out of a legitimate belief that they, as educated officials with access to other experts and who are well versed in development and peacekeeping literature, know what is best.
In response to criticism, particularly of the cases of sexual abuse by peacekeepers, the UN has taken steps toward reforming its operations. The Brahimi Report was the first of many steps to recap former peacekeeping missions, isolate flaws, and take steps to patch these mistakes to ensure the efficiency of future peacekeeping missions.
The UN has vowed to continue to put these practices into effect when performing peacekeeping operations in the future. The technocratic aspects of the reform process have been continued and revitalised by the DPKO in its "Peace Operations " reform agenda. This included an increase in personnel, the harmonisation of the conditions of service of field and headquarters staff, the development of guidelines and standard operating procedures, and improving the partnership arrangement between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations DPKO and the United Nations Development Programme UNDP , African Union , and European Union.
A capstone doctrine entitled "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines"  incorporates and builds on the Brahimi analysis. One of the main issues that the Brahimi report identifies is the lack of coordination and planning of the Peacekeeping Operations.